We present a scheme for key distribution based on bi-partite correlation of single photons. Alice keeps an ancilla photon and sends a signal photon to Bob, where intrinsic bi-partite correlation of these photons is obtained through first order intensity correlation in their detectors. The key bits are distributed through sharing four bi-partite correlation functions and photon counting. The scheme consists of two parts; first, Alice prepares deterministic photon states and Bob measures the photon states based on his random choice on correlation functions. Second, Alice guesses Bob's choice of correlation functions and sets the key bits by sending out photon states. Bob verifies the key bits through the photon states regardless Alice made a right or wrong guess. We called this key distribution scheme as prepare-measure-guess-verify (PMGV) protocol. We discuss the protocol by using a highly attenuated laser light, and then point out the advantages of using a fiber based correlated photon-pair to achieve better performance in security, communication distance and success rate of key distribution.
Superposition and entanglement are essential in developing quantum information technologies for real world applications especially for secure communication with quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] . QKD has been securely implemented in an optical free-space link (144 km) with polarization entangled photon-pair [3] and an optical fiber network (45 km) with six different protocols [4] . The BB84 and B92 protocols [5, 6] are secure against photon number splitting attack (PNS). This attack is only a threat if Alice and Bob shared a fake single-photon source such as using a highly attenuated laser light. To overcome photon number splitting attack (PNS) [7, 8] due to the use of highly attenuated laser light in a lossy long channel, decoy-state protocols [9] [10] [11] and SARG04 protocol [12] have been proposed and implemented. Measurement-device-independent QKD [13] is recently proposed to enhance secure communication against all detector side channel attacks and double communication distance by using highly attenuated laser light. The approach requires coincidence detection of a signal pulse from Alice and a reference pulse from Bob. In this work, we propose a QKD scheme based on single photon bi-partite correlation.
Correlation functions or expectation values of two observable are classical information as a consequence of the collapse of wave functions in a measurement process. Correlation functions of two Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) entangled photons are obtained through nonlocal interferences of their probability amplitudes at two observers. The quantumness of these interferences is the exhibition of particle-wave duality. The quantum mechanics without probability amplitude was proposed [14] , leading to the possibility of quantum information processing without probability amplitudes, that is, quantum information processing with correlation functions.
Bi-partite correlation of coherent light state has been observed by wave mechanical interferences of electromagnetic light fields with different modulated frequencies [15, 16] . By post-selecting a pair or multiple pairs of beat frequencies from detectors, the bi-partite or multiple-partite correlation functions were obtained for simulating the violation of Bell's inequalities [17] and the locality of Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) entanglement [18, 19] .
Recently, a coherent light field and a random phase-modulated noise field was used to generate the optical bi-partite correlation without applying any post-selecting techniques [20] .
Instead, the correlation was obtained through mean-value measurement of the multiplied random beat signals of two observers. The experiment showed that the phases information between two observers was not diminished in the presence of random noises. We further interrogated the generation of bi-partite correlation by using two weak coherent states in balanced homodyne detection [21] , where quantum noises, shot noises and electronic noises were included in the measurement process. These noises were used to protect the phases information between two observers. Bits correlations were then extracted from the correlation functions.
In this paper, we present a new protocol for key distribution by using single photon bipartite correlation. The security of the protocol is protected by the principle of quantum mechanics such as quantum non-cloning theorem, superposition and entanglement. We use four bi-partite correlations to distribute key between Alice and Bob. Our protocol is relied on interference of single photons, i.e., the first order intensity correlation of an ancilla photon in Alice and a signal photon in Bob. These single photons have to be intrinsically correlated through a highly attenuated laser light or a photon-pair source. We will first discuss the protocol by using single photons (ancilla and signal) prepared from a highly attenuated laser light. Our protocol requires coincidence detection of ancilla photon and signal photon. We then discuss the use of a fiber based correlated photon-pair or two time-synchronized deterministic single-photon sources for improving the success rate of key distribution and increasing the communication distance by factor two in comparison to the use of a highly attenuated laser light. The correlated photon-pair is easy-to-use and more tolerant to decoherence compared to an entangled photon-pair. The essence of the paper is to propose a new scheme for key distribution based on single photon bi-partite correlation.
Secure communication between Alice and Bob is established through four types of bi-partite correlation functions (C1, C2, C3, C4), which can be divided into two groups (Ψ, Φ). Alice first prepares a sequence of deterministic states, Bob measures each photon state randomly based on his random choice on C1, C2, C3, or C4 and then tells Alice through classical channel about the sequence of groups (Ψ, Φ) that he has randomly chosen. Alice guesses the correlation based on the group information and sets the key bit by sending another signal photon to Bob. Bob verifies the key bit by the outcome of his measurement regardless Alice made a right or wrong guess. We called this scheme as prepare-measure-guess-verify (PMGV) protocol.
The proposed experiment setup is shown in Fig.1 their HWPs. We need to choose the best settings for their HWPs so that we could obtain maximum correlations of their photons and also distribute the key effectively.
We illustrate each bi-partite correlation function and the optimum settings of θ 1 and θ 2 in Fig.2 . For the correlation function C1 = −cos2(θ 1 − θ 2 ), Alice and Bob receive their photons with interference terms as given by +Cos(2θ 1 + (φ β − φ α )) and −Cos(2θ 2 + (φ β − φ α )), respectively. By projecting the HWP5 in Alice at θ 1 = +45
• and also the HWP3 in Bob at θ 2 = +45
• , we have C1=-1 indicating maximum anti-correlation between Alice and Bob. This can be easily noticed with the help of phase-locking (φ β − φ α ) = −90
• , the interference term in Alice, +Cos(2(+45
This implies that the ancilla photon in Alice passed through the PBS2 and detected by the ′ + ′ SPD3, and also the signal photon in Bob is reflected from the PBS1 and detected by the ′ − ′ SPD2. For the correlation function, C2 = +cos2(θ 1 + θ 2 ), the maximum correlation C2=+1 is obtained by projecting θ 1 = +45
• and θ 2 = −45
• . Alice has the same interference term, but Bob has the interference term valid detection for preparing the signal photon that sent to Bob. We will divide the four bi-partite correlations into two groups, C1,C2 → Ψ and C3,C4 → Φ. Now, let's discuss the protocol of key distribution between Alice and Bob using the shared correlation function as shown in Fig.3 . The scheme can be divided into two parts; the first part is Prepare-Measure (PM) part and the second part is Guess-Verify (GV). In the PM part, Alice prepares an ancilla photon for herself and also a signal photon to be sent to Bob. First, Alice has to verify her ancilla photon is always bit ′ 1 ′ or detected by the ′ + ′ SPD3 as discussed before in Fig.2 , so that the signal photon sent to Bob is phase-locked, We illustrate the guess-verify part in more detail in Fig.4 • and θ 2 = +45
• that they used in the prepare-measure part. If Alice's guess on C1 is correct through the group information Ψ sent by Bob where Bob did choose the C1 for his choice, the interference term in Alice −cos(2θ 1 + (φ β − φ α ))) → −1, i.e., bit ′ 0 ′ or the ′ − ′ SPD4 will detect the ancilla photon. While the interference term in Bob +cos(2θ 2 + (φ β − φ α ))) → +1, i.e., the ′ + ′ SPD1 will detect the signal photon which means 'Yes', so Bob knows that Alice has guessed the right correlation function C1 and hence the bit ′ 0 ′ for the key bit. Now, if Alice guessed C2 instead of C1, so her guess is wrong. The interference term in Alice +cos(2θ 1 − (φ β − φ α ))) → +1 or bit ′ 1 ′ . Note that Alice has to apply the phase shift φ β − φ α = +90
• for her guess on C2 and C3 as discussed above. While the interference term in Bob +cos(2θ 2 + (φ β − φ α ))) → −1 or the ′ − ′ SPD2 will 'click' which means 'No', so Bob knows Alice has guessed the wrong correlation or bit. From here, Bob knows the key bit set by Alice regardless Alice' guess is right or wrong. Similarly, Bob knows Alice's guess for the other correlation functions C2, C3 and C4 in the guess-verify part as
The scheme for key distribution between Alice and Bob.
illustrated in Fig.4 .
To illustrate the PMGV protocol more systematically, we will discuss an example of the key distribution as shown in Fig.5 .
Step 1-4 is for the PM part and
Step 5-9 is for the GV part.
Step 1: Alice sends a phase-locked signal photon to Bob by making sure the ancilla photon is detected in her ′ + ′ SPD3 or bit ′ 1 ′ . Alice kept the projection angle θ 1 = +45
• .
Step 2: Bob measures the signal photon based on his random choice of correlation function. He chooses C3, C1, C4 and C2 and keeps the projection angle θ 2 for each correlation function.
Step 3: He obtains bit Alice guesses C4, C1, C3, and C2.
Step 6: Alice uses the projection angle she kept in Step 1. She measures the ancilla photon and obtains the bit
′ , and ′ 1 ′ as her key bit.
Step 7: Bob measures the signal photon prepared by Alice's guess by using the sequence of projection angle θ 2 he kept in Step 2. Bob knows whether Alice's guess is right ('Yes') or wrong ('No') as illustrated in Fig.4 .
Step 8a: Bob knows the key bits that Alice set based on her guess even though Alice's guess was wrong. Steps 8b and Step 9 are the alternative of
Step 8a in the case Bob did not receive the signal photon sent by Alice.
Step 8b: Bob tells Alice about his valid detection. The 'x' means no valid detection and the ' √ ' means valid detection.
Step 9: Bob and Alice shared the remain bits as their raw secret key.
This protocol is based on the bi-partite correlation function generated through the interference of the ancilla photon in Alice and the interference of the signal photon in Bob.
These interferences are spatially separated but their phases are intrinsically correlated in the laser. Since the signal photon is prepared from a highly attenuated laser light, the protocol is still vulnerable to PNS attack. The protocol is secure against PNS attack if a correlated photon-pair is used as a photon source for replacing the highly attenuated laser light. The correlated photon-pair is much easier to generate and less sensitive to decoherence than an entangled photon-pair. The high purity of correlated photon-pair at the telecom wavelengths can be generated through a four wave mixing process in a 300 m dispersionshifted fiber (DSF). The coincidence to accidental coincidence ratio (CAR) > 100 has been achieved by suppressing the spontaneous Raman scattering process in a DSF cooled at the liquid nitrogen temperature 77K [24] . In the four wave mixing process, two pumps photon Since our protocol requires coincidence detection of ancilla photon and signal photon, the highly attenuated laser light can provide the success rate of key distribution as given by n a n s , where n a and n s are mean photon number per pulse for the ancilla and signal photons.
As for the use of a fiber based correlated photon-pair, the protocol is complete secure against PNS attack. The success rate for the key distribution is given by the production rate of the photon-pair per pulse, n pr . A cooled dispersion-shifted fiber at liquid nitrogen temperature (77K) can provide the purity of photon-pair with CAR > 100 at photon-pair production rate of 0.01 per pulse. For example, if we use the commercial available (u 2 t) fiber modelocked laser at repetition rate of 10 GHz [25] and a high speed low dark count superconducting single photon detector, we will obtain raw secret key bits about 0.01 × 10 9 × 0.01(total detection efficiency) ∼ 10 5 key bits. After applying private amplification and information reconciliation protocols, we predict to obtain about 25000 secret key bits. If a highly attenuated laser light is used to prepare the n a n s = 0.01 per pulse for both ancilla and signal, we can have the same performance as discussed above. In ideal case, the best performance of this protocol can be achieved by replacing highly attenuated laser light or photon-pair source with two time-synchronized deterministic single photon sources, where the n a n s = n pr = 1.0 per pulse. It is worth to note that the photon-pair source and two single-photon sources can increase distance of communication between two parties by factor of two.
In conclusion, we have proposed a prepare-measure-guess-verify (PMGV) protocol for key distribution using four types of single photon bi-partite correlation functions between two parties. We show that the PMGV protocol can be implemented with a highly attenuated laser light source, which is often used as alternative single photon source. 
